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*Research  Associate,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute The  first line of defense  for workers  laid off from  their jobs  has been  Unemployment  Insurance 
(III).  Unemployed  workers  usually  qualify  to  receive  benefits  for  a maximum  of 26  weeks,  and  only 
iftheir  unemployment  is of no  fault  of their  own.  They  must  also  show  that  they  have  been  looking 
for reemployment.  The problem  with the  system  as it was  designed  is that  it assumes  that  layoffs  will 
be  temporary  and  that  in most  cases  workers  will be  recalled  to  their  employers.  With  deepening 
recessions  over  the  years,  downsizing,  and  increasing  numbers  of plant  closures  resulting  in greater 
permanent  displacement,  the  UI  system  has  increasingly  found  itself  strained.  Over  the  years,  the 
average  duration  of unemployment  has increased,  and  growing  numbers  of people  have  applied  for 
extended  benefits.  Increasingly,  fewer  workers  are  on  short-term  layoff,  and  more  and  more  are 
experiencing  longer  spells  of unemployment.  A system  designed  to  provide  temporary  assistance  to 
tide workers  over until  they  are recalled  is ill equipped  to  assist  them  with  transitions  from  one  type 
of labor to  another.  Because  the  UI  system  was  an outgrowth  of the  disruption  caused  by industrial 
production,  it would  seem  that  UI  needs  to  be reformed  so that  it can  better  meet  the  needs  of  an 
economy  in transition  -- from  industrial  to  post-industrial  or from  production  to  information. 
The  changing  nature  of the global  economy  raises  the  question  of whether  an unemployment 
insurance  system  can  do  more  for  displaced  workers  than  simply  providing  them  with  income 
maintenance.  And  indeed  Congress  has sought  to  address  some  of these  issues  by mandating  through 
the  “Unemployment  Compensation  Amendments  of  1993”  that  new  UI  claimants  upon  filing  be 
profiled  according  to  their  demographic  characteristics  and  work  history.  Those  identified  as most 
1 likely to exhaust  regular  UI  are then  targeted  for job  search  assistance.  Because  the  program  hasn’t 
been  fully implemented,  there  is no way of knowing  how  successfbl  it has been.  But  in demonstration 
projects  conducted  in a few  states  during  the  198Os, it was  found  that  dislocated  workers  receiving 
job  search  assistance  did  find  work  from  one  half week  to  four  weeks  more  quickly.  The  average 
reduction  in most  states  was  about  one  week.  There  also  appeared  to  be no  effect  on  weekly  wages 
(U.S.  Department  of Labor,  1995a).  Initiatives  like this  are  essentially  early  interventions  which  will 
offer  some  assistance  to  some  of the  UI  population,  and  they  indeed  represent  a positive  first  step. 
But  for  those  who  are truly  long-term  unemployed,  obtaining  employment  an average  of one  week 
early  isn’t  going  to  make  a big  difference. 
At  the  same  time,  there  is  a hodgepodge  of  several  different  training  programs  targeted 
towards  different  groups  of  people,  but  none  of  them  are  specifically  tied  in  with  UI.  And  the 
programs  which  do  exist  are  somewhat  disjointed.  In  an effort  to  remedy  this  situation  Congress  is 
currently  considering  the  “Workforce  Development  Act”  which  would  consolidate  Federal 
employment  training  programs,  as well  as create  a new  process  and  structure  by which  they  would 
be funded.  And while this might  help  to  some  extent,  it would  still remain  separate  and  distinct  from 
the UI  system.  At issue is whether  it is possible  for the UI  system  early  on to  assist  displaced  workers 
in obtaining  reemployment. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is to  argue  the  need  for  unemployment  insurance  reform.  At  a 
minimum  the  system  needs  to be tightened  in such  a way  that  it results  in fewer  layoffs.  Beyond  this, 
however,  the  system  needs  to  be  able to  offer  greater  assistance  to  the  growing  population  of the 
long-term  unemployed.  These  are  the  ones  who  have  been  permanently  displaced  from  their  jobs 
because  of  either  plant  or  company  closure  or  changing  technologies.  And  if they  aren’t the  victims 
2 of plant  closure,  they  are likely  to  be the  victims  of corporate  restructuring  or  “downsizing.”  In the 
last  decade,  this  population  has  more  than  doubled.  These  people  are  part  of  a growing  class  of 
chronically  unemployed  for whom  a policy response  is essential.  The  logic  of UI  rests  on  the  premise 
that  individuals  need  to be afIorded  the  opportunity  to  search  and  that  given  the  opportunity  they  will 
find a job  which  best  matches  their  skills and experience.  But those  who  receive  assistance  longer  than 
the norm  call into  question  the  underlying  assumption  that  during  this  period  an appropriate  fit will 
emerge.  Ultimately  I argue  that  something  other  than  merely  extending  long-term  benefits  needs  to 
be done.  To  continue  extending  long-term  benefits  is to  merely  apply  some  of the  same  assumptions 
commonly  made  about  the  short-term  unemployed  to  the  long-term  unemployed  when  the  realities 
may  in fact  be  different. 
UI Labor  Disincentive? 
The  Unemployment  Insurance  system  is  best  characterized  by  its  income  maintenance 
function.  Each  state  establishes  a trust  fund  financed  through  premiums  levied  against  employers.  It 
offers  laid-off  workers  critical  income  protection  during  temporary  spells  of joblessness,  and  by 
helping  to  protect  the  incomes  of jobless  workers  it thus  sustains  ordinary  spending  habits.  UI, 
therefore,  has  had  the  effect  of  giving  the  economy  a  needed  boost  during  times  of  recession 
(Burtless,  1991). It is also distinguished  from  public  relief  in that  it functions  as an insurance  system. 
This is an important  value  in as much  as it enables  recipients  to  maintain  their  self-respect,  as well  as 
it prevents  them  from  sliding  into  destitution.  By  design,  the  system  is  supposed  to  contribute  to 
reemployment.  First, by placing  limits on the weekly  amount  and the  duration  of benefits,  it minimizes 
the  disincentive  to  work,  i.e. the  preference  for  leisure.  Secondly,  by requiring  recipients  to  engage 
3 in a job search and to be available for work, it further reduces the disincentive to work  (Blaustein  et 
al., 1993). 
Most  state UI programs  provide  eligible unemployed  workers with a monetary  payment to 
replace some percentage of their previous wages. One justification  for the payment  of unemployment 
benefits is that it allows an individual to focus on searching for a new job  (ACUC,  1995). At the same 
time, however, much ofthe  literature  also holds UI to be a source of moral hazard.  Unemployment 
compensation  may have a negative  effect on the labor market because it causes the unemployed  to 
be less willing to  accept  some job  offers, as well as it may induce those  in employment  to  quit to 
become  unemployed.  The  rise  in  unemployment  in  Western  Europe  since  the  1970s  and  its 
persistence in a number of countries, is attributed in part to more generous  levels of benefit payments 
(Atkins and Micklewright,  1991, p. 1679). 
Feldstein has argued that the current system of UI provides substantial incentive for increased 
temporary-layoff  unemployment;  of  all unemployment  spells temporary  layoffs  account  for  50 
percent.  UI  essentially  increases the duration  of any given spell of unemployment,  but it may also 
induce more very short spells of unemployment.  His argument is that employers are more willing to 
lay off workers when they are confident that they will return when recalled.  Similarly, employees  are 
more willing to be laid off if they can be confident that they will be recalled. The average UI benefit 
replacement  ratio  resulting  from  current  law  can  account  for  about  half  of  temporary-layoff 
unemployment.  He thus found that an increase in the UI benefit replacement  ratio from 0.4 to 0.6 
raised  the  temporary  layoff  unemployment  rate  by about  0.5 percentage  points  --  or  l/3  of  the 
average temporary  layoff unemployment  rate of 1.6% in March of 1971 (Feldstein,  1978). 
Similarly, Katz and Meyer found that employer recall policies were primary determinants  of 
4 durations  of  unemployment  spells  of  individuals  with  non-negligible  recall  prospects.  Those  who 
expect  to  be recalled  spend  less time  searching  for jobs  and  have  a lower  finding  rate  than  other  UI 
recipients.  Also  the  probability  of  leaving  unemployment  and  finding  new  jobs  increases  greatly 
around  the  time  that  UI  benefits  lapse  (Katz  and  Meyer,  1990).  Contrarily,  it is suggested  that  the 
reduced  availability  of  UI  benefits  to  job  quitters  might  be  expected  to  reduce  the  frequency  of 
quitting  because  it increases  the  expected  costs  of leaving  employment.  If the  denial  of benefits  does 
in fact reduce  quitting,  it would  only  underscore  the  voluntary  aspect  of quitters’  unemployment  and 
strengthen  the  argument  that  such unemployment  shouldn’t  be  compensated  (Solon,  1984).  But  what 
about  those  who  aren’t on temporary  layoff expecting  to  be recalled?  Can  those  who  are  permanently 
closed  out  of  their  jobs  afford  leisure  on  the  assumption  that  they  will  be  recalled?  Displacement 
differs  from  temporary  layoffs  in that  those  jobs  that  have  been  eliminated  will  never  exist  again 
(Martin,  1983). 
To  the  extent  that  UI  immunizes  workers  from  risk,  it affords  them  greater  opportunity  to 
search  for jobs  with  an appropriate  match  between  the  requirements  of available  jobs  and  the  skills, 
education,  and  training  of  the  unemployed.  In  this  regard,  UI  does  offer  some  leisure.  The 
income/leisure  combination  offered  by most  UI  programs  might  be preferred  by some  UI  recipients 
to  the  combination  offered  by  a return  to  comparable  employment.  Consequently,  some  recipients 
may not  be diligent  in their  search for work,  or they may adopt  criteria  for  accepting  employment  that 
are unreasonably  high  from  society’s  point  of view.  This  might  result  in a tendency  to  remain  on the 
unemployment  rolls for longer  periods  of time  (Kelly,  1979).  As Meyer  has  further  found,  higher  UI 
benefits  have  a strong  negative  effect  on the probability  of leaving  unemployment,  but  the  probability 
of leaving  rises  dramatically  just  prior  to  when  benefits  lapse  (Meyer,  1990). 
5 Feldstein  and  Poterba  explain  the  disincentive  to  intensively  search  for  work  in  terms  of 
workers’  reservation  wages  -- the  minimum  wages  that  they  will be willing  to  accept.  The  principal 
imperfection  in modern  labor  markets,  as they  see  it, is the  downward  rigidity  of  existing  nominal 
wages.  Consequently,  the  decline  in marginal  value  of the  product  of  an employee’s  labor  is likely 
to  cause  temporary  or permanent  layoff,  as opposed  to  a downward  wage  adjustment.  Employees 
who  lose jobs  are likely to fmd that the wages  at their  next jobs  are lower  than  the  wages  at their  last 
jobs. 
Through  a comparison  of reservation  wages  with  wages  of last jobs,  Feldstein  and  Poterba 
attempt  to  show  the  distortions  caused  by the  UI  system.  They  assume  that  the  probability  of finding 
an  acceptable  job  is  likely  to  decline  as  the  reservation  wage  exceeds  the  previous  wage.  The 
individual’s  private  reservation  wage  is then  said  to  be  at least  equal  to  his  or  her  previous  wage. 
From  their  sample  of unemployed  individuals,  24 percent  indicated  that  they  would  accept  a wage 
less than  90 percent  of their  last wage.  An  additional  11 percent  were  willing  to  accept  from  90- 100 
percent  of their previous  wage.  A further  27 percent  indicated  that  they  would  accept  any wage equal 
to  or  greater  than  the  last  wage,  but  nothing  less.  The  cumulative  percentage  of  reservation  wage 
rates was  less  than  or  equal  to  62 percent  of their  previous  wages.  The  remaining  38 percent  of the 
sample  had a reservation  wage  greater  than their previous  earnings.  About  l/4  of those  who  required 
a wage  increase  said  they  would  accept  an  increase  of  less  than  10 percent.  Fully  28  percent  of 
unemployed  persons  in the  sample  said they would  only return  to  work  if they  received  a wage  which 
was  10 percent  higher  than  their  previous  wage. 
According  to Feldstein  and Poterba,  the important  reason  for the  high  reservation  wage  ratios 
and the high  fraction  of individuals  requiring  a wage  increase  as a condition  of reemployment  is the 
6 system  of UI benefits.  The Department  of Labor  only  classifies  one  as unemployed  if one  is available 
for work  and has made  efforts  to  find  a job  within  the  past  four  weeks.  But  no  limit  is placed  on  the 
individual’s  reservation  wage  in  defining  a  willingness  to  work  --  hence  unemployment  status. 
Although  UI reduces  the  cost  of unemployment  to  the  individual,  it can  raise  the  unemployment  rate 
in several  quite  different  ways.  For the individual  who  is unemployed  and  looking  for  a job,  the  lower 
cost  of  unemployment  implies  a  higher  reservation  wage,  and  therefore  a  longer  period  of 
unemployment.  Among  those  who  are  employed,  the  low  potential  cost  of unemployment  induces 
temporary  layoff  in  response  to  reductions  in  product  demand  --  even  in  response  to  seasonal 
fluctuations  in employees’  marginal  revenue  product  (Feldstein  and  Poterba,  1984). 
An alternative  explanation,  however,  is that  those  who  have  been  closed  out  of a job  may  be 
in a state  of denial. During  the early  days  of their  unemployment,  they  do  not  really  believe  that  they 
are not  going  to return  to their jobs.  But  as time  passes  they  become  more  fully  aware  of this  reality. 
Burtless  has  suggested  that  current  knowledge  of the  impact  of  UI  on  labor  supply  is  simply  too 
C-agile. “Neither  theory  nor  available  empirical  evidence  permits  us to  predict  unequivocally  the  net 
effect  of unemployment  insurance  on  labor  supply.”  By  providing  insurance  to  workers,  UI  offers 
something  of value  to  people  who  become  employed,  and  it may  thus  increase  the  attractiveness  of 
market  work.  By  supplementing  the incomes  ofworkers  who  become  unemployed,  it can  slow  down 
the process  of reemployment.  But  without  better  empirical  evidence  than  is currently  available,  it is 
impossible  to  predict  which  of these  two  basic  effects  will predominate.  UI  may  increase  the  amount 
of  economically  productive  job  search.  It  might  raise  the  average  productivity  of  workers  by 
improving  the match  between  jobs  and  workers.  In  situations  where  there  are two  job  vacancies  and 
two  unemployed  workers,  it can  be economically  productive  to  subsidize  the  workers  so that  they 
7 sort themselves  into the two jobs  that  maximize  their joint  output  and  earnings.  This isn’t to  say that 
there  aren’t adverse  consequences,  rather  there  is insufficient  evidence  to  make  any grand  sweeping 
categorical  conclusions  (Burtless,  1990,  pp.  70,  82). 
Feldstein  and  Poterba  may  in fact  assume  too  much  with  regards  to  the  motivation  of  the 
unemployed.  It may be true  that  UI  increases  the  reservation  wages  of those  at the  lower  end  of the 
income  scale, but  does  it really have much  of an impact  for those  at the  top?  What  benefit  could  there 
be for a high income  individual  to  sit at leisure  at a fraction  of previous  pay  over  intensely  searching 
for a replacement  of previous  wages?  UI  more  closely  approximates  the  previous  earnings  of those 
at the lower  end of the  scale. Because  each  state imposes  a maximum  benefit,  the  higher  the  previous 
income  was,  the  less  attractive  UI  becomes.  What  is  not  known  from  this  study  is  who  the 
unemployed  are,  i.e  their  demographics.  Assuming  that  there  is  a  reservation  wage  for  each 
individual,  what  other  factors  might  contribute  to  it? That  is, previous  income  might  be one  factor 
in accounting  for reservation  wages,  but  education,  tenure  in the  labor  force,  and  other  considerations 
might  be  others. 
Atkins  and  Micklewright  argue  that  there  has  been  a failure  to  distinguish  several  different 
labor market  states. Employment  cannot  be regarded  as homogeneous.  A temporary  job  in the black 
economy  is not  the  same  as a career  position  with  a large  enterprise.  Work  cannot  be treated  as a 
homogeneous  state  either.  The  unemployed  person  who  returns  to  work  may  enter  employment  or 
self-employment.  Employment  may  be fit11  or  part-time.  There  is a distinction  to  be made  between 
“regular”  and  “marginal”  jobs.  Regular  jobs  are  full  time,  covered  by  statutory  employment 
protection,  have the  expectation  of continued  employment  are part  of the  legal  economy.  They  may 
also offer  some  prospect  for  promotion  and  may  involve  a substantial  element  of general  or  specific 
8 training.  Marginal  jobs,  on the other hand,  may  be temporary  or casual;  they  may  be dead-end  jobs; 
they may be part of the black  economy;  and/or  they  may  be home  workers.  Atkins  and  Micklewright 
maintain  that  the  treatment  of unemployment  compensation  in the  literature  has  been  unsatisfactory 
for three  reasons:  1) In focusing  on  benefit  levels,  it has ignored  other  dimensions  of unemployment 
compensation,  whose  effects may be more  important;  2) It has taken  too  simplistic  a view  of the  way 
in which  unemployment  benefits  work  in the  real  world;  and  3) The  exit  from  unemployment  may 
have  quite  different  consequences  depending  on the  destination  (Atkins  and  Micklewright,  199 1, pp. 
1685,  1721). 
Unemployment  does  more  than  simply  cause  a disruption  in  people’s  income  that  can  be 
partially  compensated  through  UI benefits;  it causes  disruption  in the  structure  and  fabric  of their  lives 
that  cannot  be compensated  no matter  how  generous  the provision  (Pappas,  1989; Buss  and  Redburn, 
1983).  The  real  issue  is the  design  of  the  system  given  current  realities,  rather  than  its  distortive 
impact  on  the  behavior  of the  unemployed.  Could  it be better  designed?  The  focus  on  reservation 
wages  also  diverts  attention  from  the  issue  of whether  there  is a possible  skills  mismatch between 
those  who  are  laid  off  and  those  jobs  which  are  available.  To  find  the  appropriate  match  may take 
some  time,  and  UI  may  offer  some  more  breathing  space. 
Demographics 
The  unemployed  population  is  by  no  means  a  homogeneous  group.  Those  who  are 
unemployed  may  be  involuntarily  unemployed,  or  they  may  have  left  their  jobs  for  a variety  of 
reasons.  They  may  also  be  defined  by their  duration  of unemployment.  A consistent  profile  of the 
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Survey’s (CPS)  1993 annual demographic file. This CPS micro data contain three records:  personal, 
family and household. In the personal record, the sample consists of roughly  157,000 individuals.  As 
most  of these individuals will fall outside the relevant universe of those  considered  unemployed,  I 
based the sample on those for whom the duration  of unemployment  variable applied. This sill leaves 
a usable sample of 5,827 unemployed  individuals. Because a concern for policy revolves  around the 
long-term  unemployed,  I divided  the usable  sample into  two  groups:  short-term  unemployed  as 
defined by a duration of 1 to 26 weeks and long-term  unemployed  as defined by a duration  of 27 to 
100 weeks. 
The short-term  population  consisted of 4,646 individuals (79.7 percent),  and the long-term 
unemployed population  consisted  of 1,lS 1 individuals (20.3 percent).  Within these categories  there 
is also variation. It is important  to note that among the long-term unemployed,  more than one-third 
were  without  jobs  for  more  than  53 weeks.  Of the  long-term  unemployed,  37.7  percent  were 
unemployed 27 to 40 weeks; 282  percent were unemployed  41 to 52 weeks; and 34.1 percent  were 
unemployed  53 to  100 weeks. Of the short-term  unemployed,  41.7 percent were unemployed  1 to 
5 weeks; 36.5 percent were unemployed 6 to 14 weeks; and 21.8 percent were unemployed  15 to 26 
weeks. 
On the  whole,  the data would  suggest that most of those  who are unemployed  either find 
reemployment  or drop out of the labor force before 26 weeks, which in most states is the point  of 
benefits exhaustion. This, however, does not dismiss the fact that over the last 25 years, the average 
weekly  duration  of unemployment  has increased, as exemplified by Table 1. 
Table I Average  Duration  of Unemployment 
10 1970  12.3 
1971  14.4 
1972  14.0 
1973  13.4 
1974  12.7 
1975  15.7 
1976  14.9 
1977  14.2 
1978  13.3 
1979  13.1 
1980  14.9 
1981  14.5 
1982  15.9 
1983  17.5 
1984  14.3 
1985  14.3 
1986  14.6 
1987  14.6 
1988  13.7 
1989  13.2 
1990  13.4 
1991  15.4 
1992  16.2 
1993  15.6 
1994  15.6 
1995  15.5 
Source: Tables provided by Lawrence H. Leith at the U.S. Department  of Labor,  Bureau of 
Labor  Statistics. 
Even though the long-term unemployed population in the  1993 CPS sample is only 20.3 percent,  the 
number of those unemployed  for more than 27 weeks has increased dramatically  over the course  of 
the post-war  period.  This trend can be seen in table II. 
Table II Share of Long-Term  Unemployment  (Thousands) 
Year  Civilian  LF  unemployed  long-term  %unemployed  %long-term 
unemployed  unemployed 
1949  61,288  3637  263  5.9  7.2 
1950  62,206  3288  352  5.2  10.7 
11 1951  62,016  2055  136  3.3  6.6 
1952  62,133  1883  83  3.0  4.4 
1953  63,013  1834  79  2.9  4.3 
1954  63,642  3532  325  5.5  9.2 
1955  65,022  2852  330  4.4  11.6 
1956  66,549  2750  231  4.1  8.4 
1957  66,930  2859  241  4.3  8.4 
1958  67,638  4602  682  6.8  14.8 
1959  68,370  3740  565  5.5  15.1 
1960  69,630  3852  458  5.5  11.9 
1961  70,460  4714  804  6.7  17.1 
1962  70,613  3911  580  5.5  14.8 
1963  71,832  4070  550  5.7  13.5 
1964  73,091  3786  480  5.2  12.7 
1965  74,454  3366  349  4.5  10.4 
1966  75,770  2875  237  3.8  8.2 
1967  77,347  2975  177  3.8  5.9 
1968  78,737  2817  155  3.6  5.5 
1969  80,734  2832  133  3.5  4.7 
1970  82,77 1  4093  240  4.9  5.9 
1971  84,383  5016  522  5.9  10.4 
1972  87,03 5  4882  561  5.6  11.5 
1973  89,429  4365  342  4.9  7.8 
1974  91,950  5156  384  5.6  7.4 
1975  93,775  7929  1218  8.5  15.4 
1976  96,158  7406  1344  7.7  18.1 
1977  99,008  6991  1023  7.1  14.6 
1978  102,250  6202  645  6.1  10.4 
1979  104,961  6137  536  5.8  8.7 
1980  106,940  7637  832  7.1  10.9 
1981  108,670  8273  1162  7.6  14.0 
1982  110,204  10678  1798  9.7  16.8 
1983  111,551  10717  2545  9.6  23.7 
1984  113,544  8539  1623  7.5  19.0 
1985  115,462  8312  1277  7.2  15.4 
1986  117,834  8237  1186  7.0  14.4 
1987  119865  7425  1037  6.2  14.0 
1988  121,669  6701  807  5.5  12.4 
1989  123,870  6528  643  5.3  9.8 
1990  124,788  6874  697  5.5  10.1 
1991  125,303  8426  1104  6.7  13.1 
1992  126,982  9384  1935  7.4  20.6 
1993  128,040  8734  1777  6.8  20.3 
12 1994  13 1,056  7996  1623  6.1  20.3 
1995  132,229  7410  1405  5.6  19.0* 
* 1995 represents  an average of the first six months of 1995 
Source: calculations derived from tables contained in Economic Report  of the President,  Transmitted 
to the Congress February 1995 (Washington,  Government  Printing Office, 1995), p. 3 14; and tables 
provided  by Lawrence  H. Leith at the U.S. Department  of Labor, Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
The long-term  unemployment  rates also vary according  occupation:  Some of this variation  can be 
seen in the following  table which covers  1994 and the first six months of 1995: 
Table  IIa  Long-Term  Unemployment  According  to Occupation 
Occupation 
Managerial  and Professional  Specialty 
Technical,  Sales and Administrative  Support 
Service Occupations 
Precision,  Production,  CrafI and Repair 
Operators,  Fabricators  and Laborers 














Source:  These figures were provided  by Peter Katton  on the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics through  a 
phone conversation, 
What is interesting is that in recent years a  higher percentage of managerial and professional  specialty 
occupations have been suffering long-term unemployment. This can in part be attributed  to the recent 
trends  in  corporate  downsizing.  Otherwise,  it becomes  clear  that  the  percentage  of  long-term 
unemployed on average has increased dramatically from the 1949 to 1974 period to the  1975 to  1995 
period. Despite a few peaks between  1949- 1974, the percentage  of  long-term  unemployed  relative 
to  overall  unemployment  rates was on average  only half of what  it was after  1974. Peaks  can be 
explained  in terms  of recessions,  but the  averages rarely appear to  return  to prerecession  levels. 
Rather  the  duration  of unemployment  appears to  increase  for more  and more  people,  with  each 
13 recession  setting  a new  benchmark. 
In  constructing  a  profile  of  the  unemployed  population,  it  is  useful  to  know  the  age, 
educational  level,  industry,  occupation,  sex,  unemployment  insurance  status,  and  the  reason  for 
unemployment.  Because  the  goal  is to  understand  the  differences  between  the  short-term  and  long- 
term  unemployed  populations,  the  standard  set  of  demographic  variables  proves  useful.  Variables 
such  as education  and age do  impinge  on the  issue  of reservation  wages.  So too  does  marital  status, 
as it may  reflect  the  level  of obligations  which  may  either  affect  the  imperative  one  views  obtaining 
reemployment.  Moreover,  it is important  to  know  just  what  types  of people  in terms  of gender  and 
race are likely to be affected  more  by long-term  unemployment.  These  data  show  that  there  are  some 
significant  differences  between  the  two  populations. 
On the  age variable, the long-term  unemployed  population  on  average  tends  to  be  older  The 
age  distribution  can  be  seen  in the  table  below: 
Table III Age Distribution 
Age  Short- term 
0 to  17  9.7 
l8to24  25.0 
25 to  34  27.7 
35 to44  19.9 
45 to  54  11.3 
55 to  64  5.4 
65 to  72  .8 










Among  the  short-term  unemployed,  over  50 percent  falls into  the  18 to  34 age  cohort,  whereas  over 
50  percent  falls into the  25 to  44 age cohort  among  the long-term  unemployed.  Among  the  long-term 
unemployed,  52 percent  fell  into  the  25-44  age  cohort.  The  long-term  unemployed  are  also  more 
14 likely to be men than women. Although in both categories unemployment among whites is higher than 
among other groups, the picture is different within racial categories.  Within racial categories,  a lower 
percentage  of whites  are  long-term  unemployed  than  are  short-term  unemployed,  and  a higher 
percentage  of blacks are long-term unemployed  than are short-term  unemployed.’ 
Table  IV  Distribution  by  Gender  and  Race 
Short- term  Long-term 
Gender 
Male  58.9  65.3 






Asian or Pacific 
Islander 
Other 
81.2  76.9 
14.3  18.0 
1.9  1.2 
2.0  3.0 
.6  .8 
When it came to marital status, among the long-term unemployed 46.4 percent were married, whereas 
45.8  percent  of the short-term  unemployed  had never been married. Otherwise, higher numbers of 
the long-term unemployed were widowed  (1.8% v. 1.5) and divorced or separated (17.5% v. 13  2). 
One argument  for longer  durations  of unemployment  posits that there  is a skills mismatch 
between the skills necessary for those jobs which exist and the skills of those who are unemployed. 
’ As this data doesn’t present information  about a group’s unemployment  relative to its 
presence in the overall population,  categorical  statements about which groups are more or less 
likely to be long-term  unemployed  simply cannot be made. 
15 To the  extent  that  skills are measured  by educational  attainment,  the  overall  level  of  education  would 
be expected  to be lower  among  the  long-term  unemployed  than  among  the  short-term  unemployed. 
But  the results  of the  CPS  data actually  suggest  the  opposite.  Among  the  long-term  unemployed,  the 
percentage  of those  who  completed  12th  grade  with  a diploma  and  those  who  had  obtained  more 
education  including  college  was higher  than  among  the  short-term  unemployed.  Also  the  percentage 
of  those  with  an  education  of  less  than  a  12th  grade  education  was  lower  among  the  long-term 
unemployed. 
Table  V Highest  Grade  Attained 
Attainment  Short-term  Long-term 
less  than 
12th  grade  33.6 
12th  grade 
with  diploma  35.3 
some  college, 
no  degree  17.1 
Higher  education 
degree  including 
B.A.  11.8 
Advanced  post- 






The  higher  age  and  higher  education  levels  of the  long-term  unemployed  does  raise  some 
disturbing  questions.  One  might  be inclined  to  suspect  that  age  discrimination  has  an impact  on  the 
willingness  of employers  to hire individuals.  But  how  do  we  account  for  the  fact  that  the  educational 
levels  of the  long-term  unemployed  are  also  higher?  These  variables  alone  might  even  add  support 
to the theory  of reservation  wages.  One  would  expect  one’s reservation  wages  to  be higher  based  on 
both  experience  in the labor force  and  educational  attainment.  Those  with  higher  levels  of education 
are generally  able to command  higher  wages.  Those  who  are  older  with  more  experience  in the  labor 
16 market  have  indeed  become  accustomed  to  higher  wage  levels.  These  factors  alone,  however,  may 
not  be the  only  source  of higher  reservation  wages. 
It  is  perhaps  important  to  consider  that  general  educational  level  and  skills  levels  are  not 
necessarily  the  same.  Howell  and  Wolff,  for  instance,  have  observed  that  for  nonsupervisory 
occupations,  i.e those  defined  as clerical, blue-collar  and  service  occupations,  the  correlations  among 
job-based  skills  and  educational  attainment  measures  are  substantially  lower  than  supervisory 
positions.  Rather,  educational  attainment  would  appear  to  be  a much  better  measure  of job-skill 
requirements  for  professional,  technical  and  managerial  workers  (Howell  and  Wolff,  1991).  Both 
industry  and  occupation  would  have  an impact  on the  duration  of unemployment  as well.  Tables  V 
and VI present  distributions  of the  short-term  and  long-term  unemployed  according  to  industry  and 
occupation. 
Table  VI  Industry  by  major  groupings 
Industry  Category  Short-term 
Blue  Collar/crafts 
production  (manufacturing) 




Business  (finance,  invest- 
ment  & real  estate) 
Public  Administration 
Blue  Collar/service 
(transportation/communi- 
cations 
Armed  Forces 
Not  in Universe 
29.4  35.8 
21.7  20.4 
11.8  13.6 
8.6  8.6 
3.7  1.0 
3.1  2.9 
1.7  3.4 
4.8  5.5 
.5  1.0 
14.7  7.8 
Total  100.0 
Long-term 
100.0 
17 Table  VII  Occupation  by  major  groupings 
Occupation  Category  Short- term  Long-term 
Blue  Collar/service  33.2  28.7 
Blue  Collar/manufacturing 
(precision,  craft,  operators  23.1  25.1 
Technical,  sales  & administrative 
support  occupations  19.7  23.2 
Managerial  & professional 
specialty  occupations  8.9  14.2 
Armed  Forces  .5  1.0 
Not  in Universe  14.7  7.8 
Total  100.0  100.0 
It would  be useful  to  consider  these  figures  against  the  backdrop  of Industry  and  Occupation  trends 
for  the  thirty  year  period  between  1960 and  1990. 
Table  VIII  Occupational  and  Industrial  Trends  of Employed  Persons  1960-1990 
1960 
Occupation  % Emp  %LF 
Executive  & Manager  8.4  7.8 
Professional  11.2  10.3 
Technical,  sales  & 
administrative  support  2 1.6  20.0 
Administrative  support 
including  clerical 
Service  occupations  11.1  10.3 
Farming,  forestry 
& fisheries  1.9  1.7 
Precision,  production, 
craft  & repair  13.5  12.5 
Operators,  fabricators 
& laborers  23.4  21.7 
1970 
% Emp  %LF 
8.8  7.7 
15.1  13.9 
25.1  23.1 
12.8  11.8 
1.2  1.2 
13.7  12.7 
22.1  20.4 
Industry 
Agriculture,  forestry 
1980  1990 
%Emp  %LF  %Emp  %LF 
10.4  9.6  12.3  11.3 
12.3  11.3  14.2  13.2 
30.3  24.1  31.7  29.3 
17.3  15.9  16.3  15.0 
12.9  11.9  13.2  12.2 
2.9  2.7  2.5  2.3 
12.9  11.9  11.3  10.5 
18.3  6.8  14.9  13.0 
18 & fisheries  6.7 
Mining  1.0 
Construction  5.9 
Manufacturing  27.1 
Transportation,  comm- 
unication  & other public 
utilities  6.9 
Wholesale  trade  3.4 
Retail trade  14.8 
Finance, insurance & 
real estate  4.2 
Services  8.5 
Professional  & related 
services  11.7 
Public administration  5  .O 
6.2  3.7  3.4  3.0  2.7  2.7  2.5 
0.9  0.8  0.8  1.1  0.9  0.6  0.5 
5.5  6.0  5.5  5.9  5.4  6.2  5.8 
25.1  25.9  23.9  22.4  20.7  17.7  16.3 
6.4  6.8  6.3  7.3  6.7  7.1  6.6 
3.2  4.1  3.8  4.3  4.0  4.4  4.1 
13.7  20.1  18.5  16.1  14.8  16.8  15.6 
3.9  5.0  4.6  6.0  5.6  6.9  6.4 
7.8  7.8  7.2  8.4  7.7  9.4  8.7 
10.8  17.7  16.3  20.3  18.7  23.3  21.6 
4.6  5.5  5.1  5.3  4.9  4.8  4.4 
Labor force 
Size  69,877,48 1  82,897,433  106,084,668  125,182,378 
Percent  growth  18.6  28.0  18.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department  of Commerce, 
United States Summary:  General Social and Economic  Characteristics PC(l)-  1C 196 1; PC( 1)-C 1 
1972; PC80-l-Cl  1983; and 1990 CP-2-1  1993 (Washington,  Government  Printing  Office) 
What the decennial data show is that while those employed as a percentage  of the labor force in many 
industries  and occupations  have declined, particularly  in blue collar manufacturing jobs,  and some 
have remained constant, relative to labor force size, there have been significant declines. Against this 
backdrop,  the higher  percentages  of unemployment  for both  groups  in blue collar  industries  and 
occupations such as production, precision and crafl merely reflect the trends.  Given the decline in the 
nation’s industrial base, one would expect more long term unemployment  in manufacturing  industries 
and  occupations.  Ironically,  the  percentage  of long-term  unemployment  under  the  managerial  & 
professional category is 5.3 percent higher for the long-term than it is for the short-term  unemployed. 
19 Trends in corporate restructuring in recent years may partly account  for this. But it may also be that 
these people will naturally have higher reservation  wages. 
On the issue of why they were unemployed, there were significant differences between  the two 
groups  of unemployed.  The variation  can be seen in Table VI. 
Table  JX Reason  for  Unemployment 
Reason  Short-term  Long-term 
Job losers, 
layoff 




Not in Universe 
16.3  6.8 
36.5  60.7 
10.6  8.5 
22.0  16.2 
9.7  5.9 
4.9  1.9 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Overall, the long-term unemployed population is characterized by greater involuntary  unemployment, 
67.5  percent  as opposed  to  52.8 percent  of the short-term  unemployed.  This difference  is critical 
considering  that  the  principal  criterion  for  qualifying  for  unemployment  insurance  is  that 
unemployment  be involuntary.  But the other  significant difference between  the two  groups  is the 
number of people who are considered “other job losers.” Job losers who are on layoff may expect to 
be recalled to their old jobs  according to variations  in the business cycle. The category  of other job 
losers, however,  most likely represents those who are permanently  displaced -- those  who have no 
prospect whatsoever  of being recalled back to their old jobs, A higher percentage  of the short-term 
unemployed  consider themselves to be on temporary  layoff, and thus expect to be recalled.  There 
would  appear to be considerably  fewer illusions to that  effect among the long-term  unemployed.. 
These  statistics  tend  to  correspond  to  overall  trends  that  involuntary  job  loss  has become  less 
20 temporary  and more permanent. 
Every  few years  the Bureau  of Labor 
displaced. The BLS defines displaced workers as 
Statistics  conducts  a survey of workers  defined  as 
“persons 20 years and older who were released from 
jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or 
their position  or shift was abolished (BLS,  1994, p. I).” Others define displacement by contrasting 
it with temporary layof&: whereas layoffs hold out the prospect  of being recalled, displacement  holds 
out no such prospect. By this definition, displacement due to plant or firm closure means that the job 
will never return  (Martin,  1983). According  to the BLS survey of worker  displacement  during the 
early 1990s about halfof  those who lost their full time jobs during the period from  1991 to 93 were 
reemployed  in full-time jobs  by February  1994 and had earnings equal to or greater  than those  on 
their lost job. Although 53 percent of those reemployed  full time reported  earning the same or more 
than  their  jobs  which  were  lost,  those  in  transportation,  public  utilities,  construction  and 
manufacturing  were  more  likely  to  find new jobs  at  substantially  lower  wage  rates.  Their  new 
compensation  was likely to be 80 percent  or less than their lost jobs. But many others were either 
employed part-time, unemployed, or simply out of the labor force altogether.  Those with the highest 
rates of displacement were those without  substantial experience with their employers.  And persons 
with less than three years of tenure  made up half of the total  9 million displaced workers,  whereas 
they comprised only about one-third  of all workers.  The greatest number of displacements  occurred 
in the manufacturing  industry, with  1.5 million factory  workers being displaced between  199 1 and 
1993. 
According to Jacobson  et al., the earnings losses of displaced workers  should be defined as 
the difference between workers’ actual earnings and what they should have received had those  events 
21 which  led to their  displacement  never occurred.  By this definition, then, the displacement  effect is 
potentially  larger than the earnings change from immediately prior to the  separation..  Their  study 
found  that  the  earnings  of high-tenure  workers  declined  substantially  when they  were  separated. 
During  the  quarter  prior  to their job  loss, displaced workers  in the weakest  local  economies  had 
earnings losses of approximately $500 larger than those in the strongest  local economies,  and the gap 
widened to approximately $750 per quarter after displacement. Moreover,  the gap was found to have 
remained  the  same into the fifth year following job  loss. According  to their findings, job  loss was 
associated with substantial earnings losses even in the strongest  labor  market. For the period  of 1980 
to 1986, losses to dislocated workers averaged about $9,000 or 40% of their predisplacement  wages. 
And even though these losses did decline slightly over time, they never fully disappeared.  During the 
fifth year following the initial separation,  workers’ losses still averaged approximately  $6,500 or 25% 
of former earnings (Jacobson et al., 1993). “As a result, the average present discounted  value of the 
earnings losses during the period from three years before to  six years after separation  amounts  to 
approximately  $50,000 (Jacobson  et al., 1993, p. 137) .” 
These  findings  would  certainly  suggest the need to have some type  of retraining  program 
which will work to ensure that replacement wages will be similar. Also according  to the BLS survey, 
61 percent  of the displaced workers  received UI, and of those who received UI, slightly more than 
40 percent exhausted them. The proportion  of displaced workers who exhausted their benefits was 
lower in the early 1990s than it was during the  1980s when the U.S. economy  was feeling the effects 
of back-to-back  recessions  (BLS,  1994). Most  people who are laid off find reemployment  within 
twenty seven weeks. But if a considerable proportion of those who do find reemployment  either work 
in different occupations at reduced wages or as contingent workers, then the system isn’t helping them 
22 to find the appropriate  match.  Ifthere  is a gap in terms  of skills, the  system  might  need  to  be  reformed 
so  as to  help  them  develop  marketable  skills.  The  system  is merely  equipped  to  provide  temporary 
relief  and  to  move  people  off the  UI  rolls  as quickly  as possible.  And  this  simply  obscures  the  real 
issues  of whether  the  system  could  actually do  more  to  either  find  reemployment  which  best  matches 
the  skills  they  have  to  offer  with  those  required  by  employers,  or  help  them  to  obtain  the  skills 
necessary  to  obtain  the type  of employment  which  will enable them  to  continue  living  by the  standards 
they  have  become  accustomed  to. 
For  those  who  were  displaced  between  January  1991  and  December  1993,  the  plant  or 
company  having  closed  or moved  proved  to  be the  number  one  cause  ofjob  loss.  A distribution  can 
be  seen  in the  following  table: 
Table  X Reason  for job  loss 
Number 
Total 
Total,  20 years  +  4,473 
20 to  24 years  153 
25 to  54 years  3,540 
55 to  64 years  611 
65 years  and  over  169 
Men 
Total,  20 years  +  2,614 
20 to  24 years  77 
25 to  54 years  2,097 
55 to  64 years  383 
65 years  and  over  57 
Total  Plant or 















42.3  29.9  27.7 
45.5  36.3  18.2 
41.4  30.5  28.1 
47.2  25.4  27.4 
40.8  29.5  29.7 
40.9  33.0 
43.7  42.2 
40.7  32.8 
42.9  31.0 






23 Total,  20 years +  4,473  100.0  42.3  29.9  27.7 
20 to 24  153  100.0  45.5  36.3  18.2 
25 to  54  3,540  100.0  41.4  30.5  28.1 
55 to 64  611  100.0  47.2  25.4  27.4 
65 years and over  169  100.0  40.8  29.5  29.7 
White 
Total, 20 years +  3,859  100.0  41.2  30.2  28.6 
Men  2,291  100.0  40.2  33.1  26.6 
Women  1,568  100.0  42.7  25.9  31.4 
Black 
Total,  20 years +  427 
Men  219 
Women  209 
51.4  25.3  23.3 
50.7  25.2  24.0 
52.1  25.3  22.6 
Hispanic 
Total,  20 years +  361 
Men  243 







49.2  35.5  15.4 
44.9  42.0  13.1 
58.0  21.8  20.2 
Source: BLS, “Worker Displacement During the Early 199Os,”  News Release (September  14, 1994), 
Table 2. 
The BLS  survey  results  also reveal  that  a significant number  of workers  are laid off because  of 
insufficient work or the position or shift was abolished. These statistics suggest a couple of different 
conclusions.  If positions  or shifts are abolished because of insufficient work,  when added to those 
who  are laid off because of insufficient work,  a compelling argument  could be made for measures 
aimed  at  reducing  the  number of layoffs.  If, on the  other  hand, positions  or  shifts are abolished 
because of either downsizing or technological  change, those who lose their jobs within this category 
are  essentially  no  different  from those  who lose their jobs  either because  the plant  closed  or the 
company  moved.  Moreover,  it would  appear that  minorities  are affected  more by plant  closures. 
24 These  jobs  aren’t  going  to  return,  and  the  issue  is what  can  be  done  to  prepare  workers  for  those 
occupations  and  industries  that  may  take  their  place.  If the  abolition  of position  or  shift  represents 
some  combination,  the  implication  points  in the  direction  of a two-tier  policy  approach;  one  which 
distinguishes  between  the  short-term  and  the  long-term  unemployed. 
The  question  remaining,  however,  is  how  many  unemployed  workers  actually  receive 
unemployment  insurance.  According  to  the  Feldstein  reservation  wage  theory,  UI  will  prolong 
periods  of  unemployment  because  it  effectively  enables  unemployed  workers  to  maintain  higher 
reservation  wages.  Were  this to be a compelling  argument,  it would  have  to  follow  that  unemployed 
workers  are collecting  UI.  This,  however,  is not  borne  out  by the  data.  According  to  a study  by the 
Center  on Budget  and Policy  Priorities,  the  proportion  of unemployed  workers  receiving  UI  always 
exceeded  40 percent  prior to the  1980s. Between  1980 and  1994, there  was  fluctuation,  ranging  from 
a low  of 3 1.5 percent  in  1987  and  1988 to  a high  of  5 1.1% in  1992.  But  from  May  to  December  of 
1994, only 32.5  percent  of unemployed  individuals  received  unemployment  insurance  benefits  in an 
average  month.  At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  long-term  unemployed  increased  (Nichols  and 
Shapiro,  1995).  The  microdata  from  the  CPS  1993  annual  demographic  file  actually  showed  the 
percentage  to  be  even  lower.  Among  the  short-term  unemployed,  only  23.2  percent  were  receiving 
UI, whereas  76.8 percent  were  not.  Among  the long-term  unemployed  43 percent  were  receiving  UI, 
whereas  57 percent  were  not.  On the  one  hand,  we  would  expect  a higher  percentage  of the  long- 
term  unemployed  to receive  UI  because  a greater  percentage  of them  are involuntarily  unemployed. 
On the  other  hand,  we would  expect  to  see a lower  percentage  of the long-term  unemployed  receiving 
UI because  they  have  by and  large  passed  the  point  of benefit  exhaustion.  That  there  is a significant 
percentage  of  long-term  unemployed  receiving  UI  suggests  that  they  are  most  likely  receiving 
25 extended  benefits  which  raises  some  interesting  policy  implications.  And  yet,  the  question  remains: 
if as much  as 52 percent  of the  short-term  unemployed  are involuntarily  unemployed,  why  is the  rate 
of UI  recipiency  less than  half  of that? 
This  question  might  easily  be  answered  simply  by looking  at the  proportion  ofjob  losers  to 
job  leavers,  new  entrants  and re-entrants.  But  when  these  categories  were  excluded  from  the  sample, 
the  survey  showed  among  those  who  were  involuntarily  unemployed  in the  short-term  category,  only 
37.1  percent  were  receiving  UI,  whereas  62.9  percent  were  not.  Interestingly,  when  these  same 
categories  are excluded  Corn the  survey,  the number  of long-term  unemployed  covered  by UI  actually 
rises. Among  those  who  were  involuntarily  unemployed  in the  long-term  category,  5 5.3 percent  were 
receiving  UI,  whereas  44.7  percent  were  not.  As most  states  restrict  regular  UI  to  no  more  than  26 
weeks,  it must  be concluded  that  this  55.3  percent  are receiving  some  type  of extended  benefits. 
Policy  Implications 
The  demographics  of the unemployed  would  appear  to lead toward  two  opposing  conclusions. 
The first is to  Simply leave  the  system  as it is. There  are perhaps  two  arguments  for  this:  1) Because 
most  of the  unemployed  population  that  does  receive  UI  does  so for  less  than  26 weeks,  there  may 
be no real  imperative  to  fundamentally  alter  its basic  thrust  -- the  provision  of basic  insurance.  And 
2)  as most  of  the  unemployed  do  not  collect  UI,  the  use  of the  UI  system  as a vehicle  for  offering 
greater  assistance  may be limited  in its effectiveness.  And yet,  the  fact  remains  that  at least  20 percent 
of the  sample  is unemployed  for more  than  27 weeks,  and  given  past  trends  it is reasonable  to  expect 
that  the  percentage  will  rise. 
The  second  conclusion,  then,  is to  reform  the  system  so that  it offers  greater  opportunity  for 
26 individuals  to match  their  skills  with those  demanded  by employers.  This  would  point  in the  direction 
of  offering  training  assistance  so that  the  unemployed,  particularly  those  who  have  been  displaced 
from  declining  industries  and occupations,  have  an opportunity  to  develop  marketable  skills.  In  other 
words,  the  system  would,  in  addition  to  providing  basic  insurance,  become  a weigh  station  for 
individuals  seeking  to obtain  the  skills necessary  to  become  more  marketable.  The  national  trends  in 
recent  years,  coupled  with  the  sizeable percentage  of the unemployed  in the  sample,  suggests  the  need 
to  reach  this  conclusion  rather  than  the  first. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  because  the  unemployed  population  isn’t homogeneous,  policy 
must  be two-tiered.  A two-tiered  approach  would  1) reduce  the  incidence  of  layoff,  and  2) would 
help the long-term  unemployed  to  develop  those  skills which  would  make  them  marketable  in today’s 
economy.  At  a minimum,  it  must  maintain  the  distinction  between  the  short-term  and  long-term 
unemployed.  To  maintain  this  distinction  means  that  it must  do  several  different  things.  Until  the  26 
week  cutoff,  the  system  should  function  as an insurance  program  which  enables  individuals  to  have 
the  opportunity  to  search  for  up  to  26 weeks  for  a position  that  represents  the  best  fit between  their 
experience,  skills,  and  credentials  with  those  positions  that  are  available.  There  should  be  a 
presumption  in favor  of the  unemployed  being  afforded  the  opportunity  to  search  for  reemployment 
on their  own.  The  system  could  then  offer  a little  more  assistance  to  the  short-term  unemployed  by 
being tightened  so as reduce  the  number  of layoffs.  Beyond  this,  the  system  can  assist  the  long-term 
by  tying  the  receipt  of  extended  benefits  to  participation  in  some  type  of training  program,  either 
provided  by the  employer  or obtained  in the  open  market  paid  for  by the  system. 
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The first  tier  would  consist  of a set  of measures  aimed  at reducing  the  incidence  of  closure. 
At a minimum, the system  could  be tightened  by focusing  on  how  the  system  is financed.  In  all other 
countries,  UI  benefits  are  financed  by flat-rate  payroll  taxes,  or  out  of general  tax  revenues.  There 
is no  connection  between  an individual  firm’s behavior  and  its tax  liability.  In the  United  States  UI  is 
financed  through  an experience  rated  payroll tax. Firms more  likely  to  lay off their  workers  are bound 
to pay higher  taxes.  But  as Robert  Topel  points  out,  the  concept  of experience  rating  of UI  taxes  has 
very  little  relation  to  the  idea  of experience-rated  premiums  in the  insurance  literature.  Experience 
ratings  are premiums  levied  against  employers  based  on their  history  of layoff  or the  layoff  patterns 
within  their  industries.  An  imperfect  experience  rating  of UI  taxes,  however,  is likely  to  encourage 
unemployment.  Layoffs  generate  income  for  a firm’s workers  that  has  no  corresponding  cost  for 
employers,  thereby  creating  an  incentive  to  compensate  workers  with  UI  rather  than  earnings. 
Unemployment  thus  becomes  relatively  more  attractive.  It  implies  that  both  the  incidence  and 
duration  of temporary  layoff spells is increased.  Improving  the  experience  rating  involves  alterations 
in  the  UI  financing  system  that  would  make  it more  costly  for  employers  to  lay their  workers  off. 
Were  employers  to bear a greater  cost for  laying  workers  off,  they  might  consider  other  alternatives. 
At a minimum,  then,  there  should  be a more  perfect  experience  rating.  According  to  Topel, 
a reduction  in the minimum  tax rate to zero  and a dramatic  increase  in the  maximum  rates  would  have 
two  effects:  1) Unemployment  subsidies would  be sharply  reduced.  This  might  result  in the  industrial 
mix  of  employment  and  production  not  being  so  severely  distorted.  And  2) the  primary  source  of 
wedge  in layoff  and  rehire  decisions  would  also  be  eliminated.  This  might  have  a strong  impact  on 
unemployment  in general,  especially  temporary  layoffs  (Topel,  1990).  It isn’t clear  as to  how  much 
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Anderson  and Meyer  have  noted  that the  “main source  of incentives  of layoffs  on  the  margin  appears 
to  be that  the  tax  rates  rise too  slowly  as benefit  payments  minus  tax  payments  increase  (Anderson 
and  Meyer,  1993,  p.  SSS).”  Even  if large  corporations  and  multinational  firms  were  to  still find  it 
more  cost-efficient  to pay the higher  taxes  while  still laying  off workers,  smaller  firms  might  still find 
it more  difficult.  Were  nothing  else  to  be done  to  UI  and  it was  maintained  as simply  a program  of 
income  maintenance,  there  is no  reason  why  the  financing  could  not  be  restructured  to  reduce  the 
incentive  to  layoff.  This  would  in fact  be the  easiest  reform. 
Another  step which  should  be taken  as but  one  component  of a larger  package  of UI  reform 
proposals  is some  type  of work  sharing.  The  idea  would  again  be to  attempt  to  reduce  the  incidence 
of layoffs.  Work  sharing  involves  the  payment  of UI  benefits  to  employees  as partial  compensation 
for the loss of hours  worked.  So instead  of laying workers  off,  firms  simply  reduce  their  hours.  Work 
sharing  is  considered  “counter-cyclical,”  as  program  use  intensities  during  periods  of  economic 
decline  and  subsides  when  the  economy  improves.  The  principal  objective  of  the  program  is to 
maintain  employment  levels  during  periods  of  economic  decline.  Work  sharing  essentially  seeks  to 
avert  layoffs  by  redistributing  unemployment  within  a firm  rather  than  laying  off  workers.  Work 
sharing  consists  of  both  primary  and  secondary  objectives.  The  primary  objectives  are to  maintain 
local,  regional  and  industrial  employment  levels  during  periods  of  short-term  adverse  economic 
conditions,  and to  cushion  the  effects  of permanent  labor  force  reductions.  The  secondary  objectives 
are divided  into  two  categories:  firm  and  employee.  For  the  firm  they  are to  assist  firms  to  maintain 
their  skilled labor forces  intact,  and to  avoid the costs  to  employees  and  the  economy  associated  with 
temporary  layoff  -- particularly  the  costs  of recruiting  and  training  new  employees  to  replace  those 
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in maintaining  their  skill levels and work  motivation,  and to reduce the dislocation  and uncertainty 
as a result of the layoff. Another  objective is to permit a broader  sharing of the burden of reduced 
employment  activity and better income maintenance for those who would otherwise  be laid off. 
The basic concept underlying Work Sharing is to spread an overall reduction in working  hours 
across all workers in a designated unit instead of a more traditional  alternative  of temporarily  laying 
off  a  smaller  number  of  workers.  The  lost  wages  are  partially  compensated  by  UI  benefits  -- 
approximately  60% of lost wages are covered by UI benefits. On the other  hand, one of the more 
theoretical disadvantages is that of inappropriate  adjustments. That is, some workers  and firms may 
avoid more appropriate adjustment strategies because Work  Sharing encourages  them to avoid these 
more drastic, but perhaps arguably more appropriate  strategies. 
Work  sharing  has been experimented with in both Canada and California.  In Canada,  data 
suggests that 77 percent of employees who would have been laid off without work  sharing maintained 
attachment to their original employer. Another  50 percent had been hired by a different firm shortly 
after the work-sharing  period. In California, trends do indicate that workers  using work-sharing  UI 
tend to be older than those collecting regular UI, and that they also tend to primarily be employed in 
the manufacturing sector. Data from surveys of employers, union leaders and employers in California 
also  indicate  that  fringe  benefits  were  fully maintained  for  over  3/4  of participating  employees. 
Though  it isn’t a full proof  preventive  for temporary  and permanent  layoffs,  available  data  does 
suggest  that  these  programs  have  prevented  significant  amounts  of job  separation  among  those 
employees confronted with the loss of employment. Moreover, data from both California  and Canada 
provide  a general  indication  that morale is higher than it would have been with layoffs. Responses 
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workers  and work  group  solidarity.  Participating  employees  also  generally  believed  that  the  program 
provided  a greater  sense  of fairness.  Data  suggests  that  productivity  under  work-sharing  is likely  to 
be higher  for  most  firms  than  with  layoffs,  but  net  productivity  benefits  are  either  neutral  or  minor 
for average  participating  firms. It should  also  be noted  that  some  93 percent  of California  employers 
said that  they would  use it again. Four  percent  said they  weren’t  sure,  and  only  two  percent  said that 
they  absolutely  would  not  (Best,  1988). 
Still,  beginning  with  UI  costs,  Work  Sharing  is more  expensive  than  the  layoff  alternative. 
Canada  estimated  that  there  was  a 33%  cost  disadvantage  vis a vis layoffs  using  administrative  data 
on all Work  sharing  UI payments.  Approximately  $208 of UI  payments  were  received  by participants 
during  and  after  the  program  (Insurance  Program  Directorate,  1993).  According  to  Best,  a major 
source  of additional  administrative  costs  arose  from  dealing  with  the  UI  system  to  gain  approval  for 
using  work  sharing  and  arranging  the  payment  of  benefits.  Employers  also  had  to  plan  work 
reductions  and designate  participating  employees.  They  had  to  negotiate  various  details  with  unions 
and employee  groups,  adjust  compensation  and  record  systems,  monitor  affirmative  action  impacts, 
and  make  overall  operational  plans.  And  yet,  a representative  survey  of  291  firms  using  California 
work-sharing  UI  programs  during  1978  and  1980  found  wage  and  salary  costs  for  average 
participating  firms to  be 2.1  percent  lower  than  would  have  been  the  case  with  layoffs  (Best,  1988). 
Morand  has suggested  that  work  sharing would  be key to  strengthening  and  sustaining  the  UI  system 
during  the next  half century.  Though  mindful  of those  studies  indicating  greater  cost  than  traditional 
UI,  he argues  that work  sharing  can be cheaper  to administer  for workers,  employers,  and  the  system. 
It  requires  no job  search  to  be  policed  or  subverted.  It keeps  people  out  of Employment  Services’ 
31 hair.  It  doesn’t lead to denials and  appeals.  And  it is the  only  labor  market  legislation  which  enjoys 
support  from  corporations  and unions,  as well as it  appeals  to  all ends  of  the  political  spectrum. 
Because  UI  is publicly  perceived  as legislation  for  losers,  work  sharing  may  contribute  to  a more 
positive  image,  as well as enlarge  the  constituency  of  supporters  to  the  extent  that  it encourages  and 
subsidies  job  preservation.  Most  workers  aren’t fired,  but  laid off.  Work  sharing  thus  encourages  a 
rightful  expectation  that  everyone  willing  to  work  will continue  to  do  so (Morand,  1990). 
Because  29.9  percent  of those  who  have  lost  their jobs  did  so because  of insufficient  work, 
serious  UI  reform  should  consist  of  work  sharing  as  one  component.  It  would  be  particularly 
valuable  for  women  who  are  even  more  vulnerable  to  layoffs  because  of their  more  frequent  “last 
hired,  first fired”  status  (Yoon  et al., 1995, p. 45).  Reform  has to  be  designed  to  assist  every  member 
of  the  unemployed  population.  But  steps  to  assist  those  who  have  been  displaced  and  for  longer 
periods  of  time  should  come  after  steps  have  been  taken  to  first  reduce  the  incidence  of  layoff. 
Therefore,  the first prong  of UI reform  ought  to consist  of a more  perfect  experience  ratings  coupled 
with work  sharing.  At the same time,  it ought  to  be acknowledged  that  work  sharing  wouldn’t  work 
for everybody.  For  those  companies  clearly  determined  to  close  for  the  purposes  of transition,  work 
sharing  will be of little use. But  some  might  be inclined to view it as a hindrance  as it might  effectively 
slow  down  the  transition  process.  It is conceivable  that  work  sharing  might  give  both  workers  and 
their  employers  incentive  to remain  in jobs  or industries  which  don’t  hold  out  prospects  for  the  future. 
Work  sharing  might  impede  necessary  labor  market  adjustment.  For  this  reason  work  sharing  would 
not  be  compulsory,  rather  it would  be implemented  on  the  basis  of voluntary  contracts,  It  must  be 
presumed  that  employers  who  are  free  to join  or not  join  would  also  be  able to  evaluate  the  future 
prospects  of their industries.  Firms  might  even  be induced  into  entering  into  such  a contract  by being 
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It  is  beyond  this  point  in  developing  the  second  tier  that  there  are  a  couple  of  different 
options.  The  choice  of policy  directions  will  invariably  hinge  on what  assumptions  are  made  about 
The Second  Tier 
the  motivation  of those  who  are unemployed.  If it is assumed  that  the  unemployed,  particularly  the 
long-term  unemployed,  could  find work  if only they would  readjust  their  reservation  wages  to  current 
market  realities,  the  solution  may  simply  lie in reducing  UI  benefits  so  that  workers  will  have  no 
choice  but to  accept  whatever  jobs  are  available.  One  version  of this  is to  tax benefits.  But  if, on  the 
other  hand,  it is assumed  that  individual  spells  of unemployment  are longer  today  than  they  were  in 
the past because  of technological  and  other  structural  changes,  then  the  system  must  be  prepared  to 
offer  considerably  more. 
Tming  benefzts?  It may be that because  the educational  attainment,  as well  as the  age,  of the 
long-term  group  is higher  than  the  short-term  group,  so too  is their  reservation  wage.  Feldstein,  for 
instance,  has argued  that  because  unemployment  insurance  and  other  labor  market  policies  increase 
the rate ofunemployment,  UI, ifit  cannot  be eliminated  altogether,  should  be  subject  to  higher  taxes 
so that  the UI net replacement  rate  will be less.  As it currently  stands,  UI  benefits,  although  they  are 
subject  to  federal  taxation,  are  not  subject  to  the  normal  payroll  deductions  which  would  include 
Social  Security,  state taxes,  and  local  taxes.  As a result,  an individual  may  receive  a net  replacement 
rate of more  than  60 percent  relative to  potential  net  wages  if the  same  individual  was  working.  This 
is so  despite  the  fact  that  gross  replacement  wages  may  only  be  50 percent.  Therefore,  UI  benefits 
should  be  subject  to  more  taxation  so that  it will be less  attractive  (Feldstein,  1994). 
33 Solon,  for  instance,  found  that  the  introduction  of taxes  on  UI  benefits  for  higher-income 
claimants  -- those in families earning  more  than  $20,000  -- did  reduce  the  mean  duration  on  UI  from 
10.8 weeks in 1978 to  8.4 weeks  in 1979. The large duration  reduction  among  high-income  claimants 
suggests  the  possibility  that  the  introduction  of  benefit  taxation  did  indeed  affect  unemployment 
duration.  And yet, he concedes  that the work-incentive  effect  wouldn’t  necessarily  prove  that  benefit 
taxation  is a good  policy,  as it would  make  UI  less  effective  in its  objective  of  insuring  job  losers 
against  income  reductions  (Solon,  1985).  But  then,  why  assume  that  the  duration  rates  were  lower 
because  of benefit  taxation  as opposed  to maybe  more jobs  commensurate  with  their  skills  level  being 
available  in  1979  over  1978? 
One  problem  with  the  idea  of taxing  UI  benefits  is the  underlying  assumption  that  jobs  do 
exist. Certainly,  ifjobs  don’t exist, taxing benefits  will have  little  impact,  but  to  reduce  the  subsistence 
level  of  the  unemployed.  But  even  if it  were  true  that  jobs  did  exist,  they  may  not  represent  an 
appropriate  match  between  the skills which  workers  have to  offer  and  those  demanded  by employers. 
Is there  a social benefit  to be derived  from  forcing  professionals,  for  instance,  to  take  jobs  which  they 
are  clearly  overqualified  for?  At  the  other  end,  any  number  of jobs  will go  untilled  because  of  skill 
deficiencies.  Nevertheless,  as a higher  percentage  of the  long-term  unemployed  are in professional 
specialty  occupations,  it  has  to  be  assumed  that  their  wages  far  exceed  the  benefits  they  would 
receive  from  the UI  system.  It isn’t clear why  these  people  would  prefer  not  to  work  and  to  be  on UI 
at  a fraction  of  their  previous  wages.  Is it possible  that  the jobs  which  do  exist  do  not  require  the 
skills,  experience,  and  credentials  which  they  have  to  offer? 
The  fact  that  still 44.7  percent  of the  involuntarily  long-term  unemployed,  as well  as  62.9 
percent  of  the  short-term  unemployed  do  not,  or  have  not  received  UI  would  seem  to  present  a 
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artificially  inflates  them.  In  other  words,  the  idea  that  individuals  have  reservation  wages  is clearly 
plausible;  the  idea  that  UI  necessarily  boosts  them  would  appear  to  be  questionable.  Moreover,  the 
other  demographics  make  it clear that  most  of the  long-term  unemployed  are older  white  males  who 
are married  and family heads.  It has to be presumed  that they  are the  primary  earners  in their  families. 
Therefore,  it is hard  to  believe  that  there  would  be any incentive  to  remaining  on UI  at a fraction  of 
their  previous  wages.  In  order  for  UI  to  boost  reservation  wages,  they  would  have  to  collect  UI.  If 
their  so-called  reservation  wages  are high  in the  absence  of UI,  it has to  follow  that  other  forces  are 
at work.  If this  is true,  it isn’t clear  that  taxing  benefits  would  have  any  impact. 
As Topel  has pointed  out,  there  is no apparent  connection  between  social  programs  and  rising 
joblessness.  Rather  the principal  story behind  rising joblessness  is that  spells  of nonemployment  have 
become  longer.  About  two-thirds  of the  long-term  increase  in unemployment  is accounted  for  by 
spells  lasting  six months  or  more.  By  contrast,  the  frequency  of  short  spells  -- those  less  than  15 
weeks  has  remained  fairly  constant.  Moreover,  the  data  suggests  that  unemployment  and 
nonparticipation  are concentrated  among  persons  with few  currently 
interpretation,  then,  would  be  that  those  persons  who  are  doing 
human  capital  (Topel,  1993). 
marketable  skills.  An  alternative 
poorly  today  have  lost  valuable 
Good  reform  of UI would  not  assume  Ul  to be the  source  of unemployment,  but  would  truly 
assist  those  who  seek  to  be  reemployed.  Therefore,  instead  of taxing  benefits  which  is essentially 
punitive,  UI  should  offer  the  unemployed  the  opportunity  to  participate  is  some  type  of  training 
program.  The  continued  receipt  of UI  after  26 weeks  could  be made  contingent  on their  willingness 
to  engage  in training.  By waiting  until 27 weeks  of unemployment  to  impose  such  a requirement,  the 
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at  least  see  if they  can find work  on their  own.  In this vein, reform  wouldn’t represent  a sharp 
departure from what the system was initially designed to do. It continues  to uphold the fundamental 
premise of the program; that unemployment  is the result of forces beyond  one’s control. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  current  initiative,  Worker  Profiling,  could  be used  as a point  of 
departure  for  assisting  the  long-term  unemployed  much  earlier  on.  The  Worker  profiling  and 
reemployment  service system, as it is called, is an early intervention  approach  aimed at providing 
dislocated  workers  with  the  reemployment  services  to  help  speed  their  return  to  productive 
employment. Once it is fully implemented, it will identity those claimants most likely to exhaust their 
regular UI, and are thus likely to need job  search assistance in order to make a successful transition. 
The system is to envisaged to work as follows: The first UI payment triggers the profile which 
is based on the following  criteria:  recall status, union hiring hall agreement,  education, job  tenure, 
change  in employment  in previous  industries,  change in employment  in previous  occupations,  and 
local  unemployment  rate.  Claimants  either  on recall  or  covered  by union  agreement  are usually 
excluded. Those who remain are then assigned a probability of long-term  unemployment  on the basis 
of a statistical model. It is expected that states will employ a general structure which will begin with 
the profile. Then to the extent that services are available, those “identified” claimants will either be 
immediately referred to service providers or placed in a selection pool from which a referral may later 
be made. Services begin with an orientation  session advising claimants on the availability  and benefit 
of reemployment  assessment, and if appropriate  an individual assessment of each claimant’s needs 
is made. Based on this individual service plan, which is viewed as a compact between  claimant and 
service provider, the claimant may be referred to reemployment  services tailored  to the  individual’s 
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as well as identifying whatever  other needs the displaced might have so that they can become more 
marketable.  Those who are referred are then required to participate  as a condition  for further  receipt 
of UI benefits (Department  of Labor,  1994). 
Worker  profiling  could serve the purpose  of triggering  the second-tier  of UI reform  more 
quickly than the actual point of benefit exhaustion.  Instead of simply offering job  search assistance 
to those  “identified,”  the system might actually require participation  in training  much earlier on. In 
the  New  Jersey  Unemployment  Insurance  Reemployment  Demonstration  Project  (NJIRDP),  for 
instance, which served as the experimental basis for the larger Profiling policy, three treatments  were 
employed: job search assistance(JSA) only JSA combined with training or relocation  assistance,  and 
JSA combined with cash bonuses for early reemployment. Overall each treatment  reduced the amount 
of UI benefits received both in the initial benefit year and in subsequent years. Though  a relatively 
small  number  of  claimants  in the  JSA plus training  or  relocation  treatment  received  on-the-job 
training, those who did had a significantly higher earnings than did the assessed JSA only claimants 
in all quarters following the first quarter afler the claim date, It was found that on-the-job  training  had 
both a substantial and statistically  significant impact on earnings and weeks worked  throughout  the 
six-year follow-up.  The estimated  impact on earnings was equal to $9,000 to  15,000 per year, and 
the estimated impact on additional weeks worked was twelve to eighteen  . By contrast,  the JSA only 
group did do better than the control group, but not as well as the subgroup of JSA plus training that 
received  on-the-job  training.  Here  it was  estimated  that  members  of  this  group  increased  their 
earnings by an average  of $608 relative to members in the control  group. With an another  $128 in 
additional  fringe  benefits,  the  total  increase  was equal to  $736 in compensation  (Department  of 
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Worker  profiling  system,  the  UI  system  could  be transformed  from  an insurance  system  into  a 
powerful  mechanism for reemploying  dislocated workers. 
Though  it isn’t clear that  retraining would  assist all of the long-term  unemployed,  there  is 
reason to believe that it could still be beneficial to a significant number of that population.  Although 
a larger number of professionals  tend to fall into the long-term unemployed  group than  among the 
short-term, 64.4 percent of the long-term unemployed still has obtained no more than a twelfth  grade 
education. Moreover,  those industries which are expected to experience growth  in the next decade 
will require  a higher degree of skills than the blue collar manufacturing  and service industries from 
which  still a sizeable percentage  of long-term  unemployed workers  appear to have been displaced 
from. 
According to the Bureau of Labor  Statistics, the U.S. labor force is expected to increase by 
24 million  from  1992 to  2005, from  127 million to  15  1 million.  Slightly more than  5 1 million are 
expected  to  enter  the  labor  force,  with  about  28 million representing  the  replacement  for  those 
workers who leave due to death, retirement  and other reasons. Virtually all job growth  is expected 
to be in the service-producing industries. Approximately  one third of all jobs  created are expected to 
be in health, business and social services. The fastest growing jobs will be in professional  specialties, 
managerial  and technical  occupations  -- those that would require the most education.  And yet, the 
fastest growing  major occupational  group requiring little education will be the service worker.  The 
seven fastest growing occupations are health and computer related -- positions  requiring higher skill 
levels (BLS,  1993). Those trends can be seen below in Table X. 
38 Table  XI  Employment  Projections,  by  Occupation 
Employment  (1,000)  Percent  Change 
1992-2005 
2005 
Occupation  1992  Low  Mod-  High Low  Mod-  High 
erate  erate 
Total,  all occupations  129,099  139,007  147,482  154,430  14.8  21.8  27.5 
Fastest  Growing 
Home health aids  347  794  827  835  128.7  138.1  140.6 
Human service workers  189  429  445  451  127.6  135.9  139.2 
Personal  and home care aids  127  283  293  296  122.0 
Computer  Engineers  & scientists  2 11  409  447 
Systems analysts  455  891  956 
Physical & corrective  therapy 
assistants and aids  61  113  118 
Physical therapists  90  163  170 
Paralegals  95  166  176 
Occupational  therapy  assistants 
and aids  12  20  21 
Electronic  pagination  systems 
workers  18  29  32 
Teachers,  special education  358  594  625 
Medical assistants  181  296  308 
Detectives,  except public  59  94  100 
Correction  officers  282  452  479 
Child care workers  684  1,100  1,135 
Travel Agents  115  167  191 
Radiologic  technologists 
and technicians  162  252  264 
Nursery  (farm) workers  72  110  116 
Medical records technicians  76  118  123 
Operations  research  analysts  45  67  72 
Occupational  therapists  40  61  64 
Subway and streetcar  operators  22  33  35 
Legal secretaries  280  415  439 




129.8  132.0 
93.9  111.9  129.2 
95.7  110.1  120.0 
119  84.6  92.7  95.1 
173  80.2  88.0  91.4 
180  75.8  86.1  89.8 
21  70.5  78.1  80.1 
33  65.1  77.9  84.0 
648  65.9  74.4  81.0 
313  63.5  70.5  73.0 
104  60.1  70.2  76.8 
503  60.0  69.9  78.1 
1,183  60.6  65.8  72.8 
196  45.2  65.7  69.9 
267  55.4  62.7  64.6 
123  53.1  62.0  71.3 
125  54.4  61.5  63.6 
75  50.1  61.4  68.0 
65  52.9  59.6  62.5 
37  48.1  57.2  64.9 
447  48.3  57.1  59.9 and kindergarten  434  646 
Manicurists  35  54 
EEG technologists  6  9 
Producers,  directors,  actors, 
and entertainers  129  190 
Speech-language  pathologists 
and audiologists  73  105 
Flight attendants  93  121 
Guards  803  1,138 
669  682  48.9  54.3  57.2 
55  56  51.2  54.1  58.3 
10  10  46.6  53.8  55.4 
198  205  47.0  53.5  58.7 
110  113  44.6  51.3  55.7 
140  144  30.3  51.0  55.5 
17 
1,211  1,255  41.7  50.8  56.2 
18  18  43.1  50.1  51.6 
205  220  220  39.3  49.1  49.5 
104  109  110  41.4  48.3  49.9 
204  212  222  42.1  48.0  54.7 
2  3  3  -77.4  -75.3  -74.7 
1  1  1  -76.6  -74.6  -72.9 
11  12  12  -62.6  -60.2  -59.0 
12  13  14  -54.9  -50.6  -49.4 








20  -54.7  -50.3  -49.1 
6  -48.3  -40.1  -39.4 
168  -43.2  -40. I  -39.4 
10  10  -46.3  -38.4  -35.8 
41  45  46  -41.3  -35.6  -34.1 
220  227  242  -37.1  -35.1  -31.0 
9  10  10  -39.4  -35.0  -33.2 
20  22  32  -38.4  -33.2  - 2.0 
13  14  15  -37.0  -35.1  -31.0 
316  326  347  -34.6  -32.5  -28.2 
12  14  16  -41.2  -32.4  -22.1 
Nuclear medicine technologists  12 
Insurance  adjusters,  examiners, 
and investigators  147 
Respiratory  therapists  74 
Psychologists  143 
Fastest Declining 
Frame wirers, central office  11 
Signal or track  switch 
maintainers  3 
Peripheral  EDP equipment 
operators  30 
Directory  assistance operators  27 
Central office operators  48 
Station installers and repairers, 
telephone  40 
Portable  machine cutters  11 
Computer  operators,  except 
peripheral  equipment  266 
Shoe sewing machine operators 
and tenders  16 
Central office and PBX installers 
and repairers  70 
Child care workers,  private 
household  350 
Job printers  15 
Roustabouts  33 
Separating  and still machine 
operators  and tenders  21 
Cleaners and servants, private 
household  483 
Coil winders, tapers & finishers  20 
40 Billing,  posting,  and  calculating 
machine  operators  93 
Sewing  machine  operators, 
garment  556 
Compositors  and  typesetters, 
precision  11 
Data  entry  keyers,  composing  16 
62  66  68  -33.6  -29.5  -27.0 
338  393  396  -39.1  -29.2  -28.7 
7  8  8  -30.7  -26.5  -23.3 
11  12  12  -31.7  -26.4  -23.8 
Motion  picture  projectionists  9 
Telephone  and  cable  TV  line 
installers  and  repairers  165 
Cutting  and  slicing  machine 
setters  94 
Watchmakers  9 
Tire  building  machine  operators  14 
Packaging  and  filling  machine 
operators  and  tenders  319 
Head  sawyers  and  sewing  machine 
operators  and  tenders  59 
Switchboard  operators  239 
Farmers  1,088 
Machine  forming  operators  and 
tenders,  metal  and  plastic  155 
Cement  and  gluing  machine 
operators  and  tenders  35 
7  7  7  -29.3  -25.8  -24.0 
117  125  134  -29.4  -24.4  -18.7 
68  73  76  -28.1  -22.6  -19.5 
7  7  8  -26.5  -22.6  -18.4 
10  11  12  -29.4  -22.3  -19.0 
232  248  257  -27.1  -22.3  -19.4 
44  46  53  -25.7  -22.3  -10.3 
177  188  194  -25.9  -21.3  -18.8 
831  857  914  -23.7  -21.2  -16.0 
112  123  133  -27.8  -20.8  -14.3 
26  28  30  -25.7  -20.2  -12.7 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau  of the  Census,  Statistical Abstract  of the United States:  1994 (114th 
edition.)  Washington,  DC,  1994,  p. 411 
These  projections  would  only  tend  to  reinforce  the  current  trends  in what  has  come  to  be known  as 
the two-tiered  economy.  Those  working  in low-skilled  service  occupations  will find  themselves  in the 
low wage  labor  market,  while  those  working  in high-skilled  occupations  will find  themselves  in the 
high-wage  labor market.  What  does  clearly  stand  out,  however,  is that  the  fastest  growing  positions 
would  appear  to  be  skill intensive. 
Viability of Training?  There  hasn’t been  a great  deal of experimentation  with  alternative  uses 
of  UI  money  in  the  U.S.,  especially  when  it  comes  to  training.  Federal  law  does  allow  for  the 
41 continued  receipt  of  benefits  in  some  cases  if  enrolled  in  state  approved  programs,  Still,  what 
information does  exist on the  effectiveness  of training  programs  is mixed.  Currently,  there  is the  Job 
Training  Partnership  Act  (JTPA)  which  was passed  in 1992 to replace  the  discredited  Comprehensive 
Employment  and Training  Act  (CETA).  JTPA  does  provide  job  training  and job  search  services  for 
both  disadvantaged  and dislocated  workers,  but  it no  longer  provides  public  service  employment  and 
cash  stipends  for  workers  receiving  training.  As  of  1988,  JTPA  was  providing  about  $200  million 
annually  at  the  state  and  local  level  for  those  workers  permanently  displaced  from  their  jobs. 
Generally  funds  are used  to provide  classroom  training,  on-the-job  training,  and job  search  assistance 
to program  participants  (ACUC,  1995, p. 205). In  1992,  JTPA  enrolled  125,000  out  of  school  youth 
aged  16-21.  Slightly  more  than  half  were  high  school  dropouts  and  the  vast  majority  came  from 
economically  disadvantaged  backgrounds.  The  average  length  of  time  in  the  program  was  five 
months,  with  an average  cost  of $2800  per  enrolled.  The  findings  for  the  out-of-school  component 
program  were  discouraging.  JTPA  produced  no  statistically  significant  positive  effects  for  out-of- 
school  youths,  regardless  of gender.  These  findings  also  held  true  over  a two  and  one  half follow-up 
period  and  for  all  the  different  strategies  which  were  employed:  classroom  training,  job  search 
assistance,  or  a mix  of less  intensive  services.  Moreover,  there  were  no  reductions  in either  youth 
crime  or welfare  receipt  (Department  of Labor,  1995a,  p.  13). 
On the  other  hand,  the  results  from  Job  Corps,  the  most  intensive  Federal  training  program 
provided  to  any civilian population,  proved  to  be far more  encouraging.  As  of  1993,  Job  Corps  was 
enrolling  about  62,000  new  youth  with  approximately  $570  million  in total  outlays.  The  full  Job 
Corps  usually  takes  about  a year  to  complete,  but  a substantial  minority  either  end  up  dropping  out 
or being  dismissed  with  the first three  months  because  of the  difficulty  of training  and  the  strict  code 
42 of  conduct  enforced  in Job  Corps  centers.  Those  youth  enrolled  in the  Job  Corps  tend  to  be even 
more  disadvantaged  than  the out-of-school  youth  in JTPA.  More  than  80%  are high-school  dropouts 
and  three  quarters  have  never  worked  before.  It  is  a  highly  intensive,  residential  program  that 
provides  basic  education,  vocational  skills  and  a  wide  range  of  supportive  services.  And  upon 
completion  of the program,  job  placement  services  are also provided.  Over four  years  after  graduating 
from  the program,  Corps  enrollees  were  earning  an average  of  $1300  more  per  year  than  those  in the 
comparison  group.  Whereas  only  5%  of  control  group  members  attained  a high  school  diploma  or 
GED,  over  25%  of Corps  enrollees  did.  And  by the  end  of the  follow-up  period,  Corps  participants 
were  also  twice  as likely  to  attend  college.  Corps  participants  were  also  employed  on  average  over 
three  weeks  more  per year than those  in the  comparison  group.  Corps  participants  also  required  less 
government  assistance  -- they received  on  average  two  fewer  weeks  of welfare  benefits  and  one  less 
week  of UI  each  year.  Although  Job  Corps  did  not  affect  the  overall  arrest  rate,  it did  appear  to 
reduce  the  incidence  of  felony  crime  among  participants.  Because  of  the  intensive  nature  of  the 
program,  it does  lead to high up front  costs.  But  the resulting  benefits  were  estimated  to  substantially 
exceed  the  costs.  Lifetime  benefits  to  society  from  Job  Corps  training  were  estimated  to  be  about 
45%  greater  than  program  costs  (Department  of Labor,  1995a,  p.  15). 
Through  a review  of diierent  programs,  the  U.S.  Department  of Labor  has  found  that  short- 
term  training  programs  to be of little benefit,  while long-term  programs  -- those  lasting  up  to  one  year 
__ were.  Moreover,  those  who  enrolled  in a Community  College  program  also  tended  to  do  much 
better  as well  (Department  of Labor  1995a).  Further  lessons  can  also  be  drawn  from  the  Canadian 
experience.  As  part  of  its  UI  Developmental  Uses  program,  Canada  experimented  with  training 
programs,  and found  that  they  did  have  some  beneficial  results.  To  study  the  effects  of training,  the 
43 Insurance  Program  Directorate  looked  at  six categories  of workers:  Feepayers,  Job  Development, 
Job  Entry,  Skill  Shortages,  DIR,  and  non-trainees. 
Feepayers  were  comprised  of  individuals  who  were  paying  for  training  on  their  own  in 
approved  courses  restricted  to  designated  skills shortages  and language  training.  To  qualify,  recipients 
had  to  have  been  out  of  school  for  more  than  two  years  and  their  courses  had  to  meet  at least  25 
weeks,  but they  couldn’t exceed  52 weeks.  Though  they were  to  pay  for  the  courses  themselves,  they 
would  be able to  draw UJ while  enrolled.  In the Job Development  program,  clients  must  have  suffered 
long-term  unemployment  which  was  defined  as being  unemployed  for  at least  24 weeks  during  the 
previous  30,  and  most  of the  clientele  were  women.  The  Job  Entry  program  was  for  either  women 
reentering  the workforce  after an absence  of at least  three  years  (job  re-entry)  or youth  who  were  no 
longer  required  to  attend  school  and who  had little labor market  experience.  Such  youth  were  defined 
as those  who  had been  out  of school  for a minimum  of three  years  and who  had  been  unemployed  for 
at least 26 out  of 52 weeks  (job entry).  Priority,  however,  was  to  be given  to  high  school  drop-outs. 
Full-time  courses  couldn’t  last  longer  than  52 weeks,  and  part-time  courses  couldn’t  last  longer  than 
1,820 hours.  The  Skills Shortages  program  applied to those  who  were  “not job  ready”  and  who  didn’t 
meet  the  criteria  for  other  programs  could  be eligible  if counselors  felt that  they  could  benefit  from 
training.  Training  could  last  up  to  three  years,  but  only  those  clients  with  a minimum  of five  years 
in the labor force  could  train for longer  than  a year. In the DIR  program,  clients  either  took  training  -- 
often  in the  evening  -- which  didn’t  interfere  with  their  job  search,  or  didn’t inform  authorities  that 
they were  involved  in training  while  on UI.  The results  of these  programs  can  be seen  in the  following 
table: 
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Job  $361 
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31 weeks  12  33 
$8,016  $12,113  31  12  27 weeks 
19 weeks 
$324  61% 
$18,775  $24,245  28  12 
$19,981  35  10  0  weeks  $18,082 
Overall, the study found that participants in the Feepayer and Skills Shortages  programs  were 
no  more likely to become reemployed than UI-only groups. DIR, Job Development  and Job Entry 
trainees  were generally  less likely than UI-only  claimants to  obtain a job  after UI and/or  training. 
Trainees,  however,  did require  substantially  less time  --  1  l-l  7 weeks  depending  on the  training 
program  -- than non-trainees  to find a job following III/training.  Still, a modest but significant rise 
in the incidence of welfare receipt was observed for Job Entry and Job Development  clients (Park et 
al., 1993). 
What does become clear is that while training may be a short-term  solution  in that it may help 
45 workers  find jobs  sooner,  it isn’t clear that  it offers  long-term  gain  in terms  of offering  higher  income 
in the  long term.  That  is, those  who  received  no training,  once  reemployed,  may  catch  up.  And  yet, 
the fact that  long-term  unemployment  is becoming  more  of a problem  suggests  that  something  needs 
to be done  to address  the needs  of the long-term  unemployed.  Perhaps  the  greatest  problem  with  the 
idea  of government  training  is that  in addition  to  its high  costs,  it assumes  that  once  workers  have 
gone  through  a program,  they  will thus  be  ready  to  work  in new  industries.  They  don’t  necessarily 
take  into  account  the  skills  demand  of the  employer. 
Ifit  is assumed  that the long-term  unemployed  would  find  reemployment  faster  were  they  to 
have  the  appropriate  skills,  the  answer  may  then  lie in offering  an incentive  aimed  at  encouraging 
firms  to  offer  on-the-job  training.  Firms  which  have  specific  skill  requirements  ought  to  be 
encouraged  to  hire  and  train  them  in a manner  which  meets  their  needs.  This  could  be  done  in the 
form  of  tax  credits  or  vouchers  to  be  financed  from  the  fimds  which  currently  finance  extended 
benefits.  These  funds  could  be  added  to  through  a more  perfect  experience  rating.  A more  perfect 
experience  rating,  then,  would  serve the dual  purpose  of helping  to  reduce  the  number  of layoffs  and 
contribute  to  the  financing  of a reform  aimed  at assisting  the  long-term  unemployed. 
The  closest  approximation  of this  are the  employment  bonus  program  trials  in Illinois.  In an 
effort  to  encourage  workers  to  search  more  intensely  for  a job,  $500  bonuses  were  offered  to 
employees  once  they  found  reemployment.  In  other  trials,  however,  bonuses  were  offered  to  firms 
as  a way  to  encourage  them  to  hire  workers.  The  employee  trials  showed  that  workers  who  were 
offered  a bonus  found  reemployment  faster  than  those  who  were  not.  Woodbury  and  Spiegelman 
found  that  the incentives  created  by the bonus  -- paid  out  to  4,186  UI  claimants  -- reduced  the  state’s 
regular  benefits  paid to the randomly  selected  treatment  group  by an average  of  $158.  It  also  reduced 
46 the average number of weeks of insured unemployment by more than one week -- over the full benefit 
year  -- compared  with the randomly  selected control  group.  Also where  employers  were  offered 
bonuses to hire workers, workers also found reemployment faster (Woodbury and Spiegelman,  1987). 
One means by which UI could be linked to training might be through a bonus type program  approach, 
modeled  after those that offer payments to employers. 
At the  same time, the data on these experiments is inconclusive.  In a more comprehensive 
review  of these  experiments,  Meyer  has suggested  that  cost-benefit  analyses indicate  that  bonus 
experiments usually lead to small net losses for the UI program,  and ultimately  do not produce  any 
overall societal gains. If, for instance,  claimants are induced to find a job more quickly, the job they 
find may be less desirable. Although  the bonus programs revealed there to be no adverse impact on 
earnings, it isn’t clear whether  experimental results can be directly applied to a permanent  program. 
Meyer  cites  three  sources  for  this  uncertainty.  The  first  is that  if  one  group  of  individuals  is 
encouraged  to go back to work  early, they may gain employment  at the expense of others who are 
unable  to  get jobs.  Secondly, with a permanent  program,  a different fraction  of eligible claimants 
might  apply for bonuses, thereby  causing a change in the costs of the bonus offer. And thirdly,  by 
increasing the financial reward for short UI spells, a permanent bonus would probably increase the 
number of people unemployed  between job changes and increase the number of UI filers. Although 
bonus experiments do show that economic incentives do affect the speed with which people leave the 
UI rolls,  they  do not necessarily  demonstrate  the desirability of a permanent  reemployment  bonus 
program.  On the  contrary,  simple cost-benefit  analyses  suggest that  societal  net benefits  may be 
positive about one-half  of the time, but they are negative in other cases. And they actually generate 
small losses for the system. Rather,  reemployment  bonuses make filing for UI much more valuable, 
47 as claimants  become  more  eligible for  a large payment  if they  file and then  find a job  soon.  The 
permanent  adoption  of a reemployment  bonus could actually have important  unintended  negative 
effects,  for it isn’t clear just  how  such a program would affect the size of the claimant population 
(Meyer,  1995). 
And as Davidson  and Woodbury  have noted because the bonus program makes it easier to 
fill vacancies, it might aflect the job separation rate. The bonus program could make firms more prone 
to terminate workers  for cause and less prone to create conditions  that would lower the probability 
of voluntary  quitting.  Termination  and voluntary  quits create vacancies  that  are costly to fill, and 
because  the  bonuses  reduce  these  costs,  they  should  rise  as a result.  Davidson  and  Woodbury 
estimated  that  the  bonus  program  wouldn’t have a displacement  effect  on UI-eligible  nonoffered 
workers,  although  in all cases there  is some displacement  of IX-ineligible.  Still, the Illinois bonus 
program  had virtually  no effect on the earnings of those workers  who were offered  a bonus  after 
reemployment (Davidson and Woodbury, 1993). What isn’t clear from these bonus  studies is whether 
employer-based bonuses would have the same impact. The presumption  here is that more jobs would 
be available and that workers,  because they would no longer be receiving extended benefits, would 
have  no  choice  but to take  them.  The key difference,  however,  would  be that  instead  of offering 
bonuses to Simply  hire workers, money is being offered to employers to invest in the development  of 
human capital. This would represent a significant shift in emphasis from a system which was initially 
designed to offer no more than temporary assistance during periods of economic  downturn.  Another 
option would be to offer vouchers  to the unemployed  to pay for a training program  of their choice, 
and that they would be required to participate  if they would like to receive extended benefits. 
The program could be structured along the lines of a voucher system in which vouchers  would 
48 be  offered  to  employers  who  would  hire  and train  workers.  The  extended  benefits  payments  which 
now  go  to the long-term  unemployed  would  then  be  offered  to  these  employers  who  would  use  it as 
a subsidy  for the wages  they  would  pay these  workers  during  the  training  phase.  Another  possibility 
for structuring  such a program  is to  offer vouchers  to employers  who  will hire  and  train  workers,  and 
then  use the  extended  benefits  payments  as a subsidy  to  the  wages  workers  might  receive  from  their 
new  employers  during  the  training  phase.  This  would,  of  course,  be  on  the  presumption  that  once 
these  workers  have  been  retrained  for  their  new  employers,  their  employers  would  then  be  in  a 
position  to  pay  them  the  prevailing  market  wage.  This  idea  bears  some  similarity  to  any number  of 
welfare  proposals  which  would  time  limit  benefits  and  then  demand  work.  When  it  comes  to 
unemployment  policies,  we  have  to  presume  that  most  would  like to  be reemployed,  but  that  more 
assistance  will be needed  to both  create  the  openings  and  to  motivate  them.  To  reduce  the  impact  on 
the  budget,  those  identified  as  likely  to  exhaust  their  benefits  --  or  likely  to  be  in  the  long-term 
unemployed  category  -- on  the  basis  of profiling  would  be required  to  participate  right  away  in the 
second  tier  of the  system. 
While these  ideas may be helpful  to those  who  previously  lacked  education  and  training,  they 
may still be of no  consequence  to  those  who  are  older,  slightly  better  educated,  and  who  have  been 
displaced  fi-om more  professional,  specialty  positions.  For  them,  training  isn’t the  answer.  Rather,  the 
role of policy  must  be to  ease them  into another  context  in which  they  can utilize  their  existing  skills. 
As  many  of these  individuals  may  have  simply  been  “downsized”  out  of work,  perhaps  the  system 
ought  to be geared  so as to  ease  them  into  consulting  whereby  they  continue  doing  what  they  were 
doing,  but  in the  service  of  several  firms  as  opposed  to  one.  Perhaps  for  them,  the  value  of  their 
extended  benefits  could  be  offered  as a lump  sum  with  the  aim  of assisting  them  to  form  their  own 
49 businesses. 
Conclusion 
UI  reform  has  to  result  in a system  which  is ultimately  flexible.  Workers  ultimately  have  to 
be offered  the  choice  of the type  of training  they will engage  in. But  they  may  also  need  an additional 
push  as well. Therefore,  tying the receipt  of extended  benefits  to  a willingness  to  participate  in some 
type  of training  would  be useful. But  the  system  would  have  to  pay  for  the  training.  It  is because  the 
unemployed  population  isn’t homogeneous  that  a two-tiered  policy  approach  is essential.  The  first  tier 
would  seek to tighten  the  system  by adopting  measures  such  as a more  perfect  experience  rating  and 
work  sharing  in order  to reduce  the incidence  of layoff. The second  tier  would  extend  beyond  the  first 
by assisting  those  who  are going  to  be laid off,  and  who  because  they  may  be facing  the  prospect  of 
long-term  unemployment  would  need  some  additional  training  or  retraining. 
For  the  UI  system  to  be  suitable  to  the  needs  of a changing  economy,  it must  do  more  than 
merely  provide  income  maintenance  on  the  outdated  assumption  that  whatever  jobs  are  lost  will 
simply  return  with  changes  in  the  normal  business  cycle.  The  system  has  to  recognize  that 
unemployment  is  not  the  homogeneous  category  it  might  have  been  assumed  to  be  during  its 
inception  in 1935. Increasingly,  there  is a distinction  to  be made  between  the  short-term  unemployed 
and  the  long-term  unemployed,  and  the  ranks  of the  long-term  unemployed  are  growing.  The  goal 
of UI  reform  isn’t merely  to  achieve  greater  efficiency  in facilitating  reemployment,  but  to  enhance 
a core  value  of American  society:  work. 
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